Following sentences are quoted and extracted from
The Nanjing Incident: Japanese Eyewitness Accounts-Testimony from 48 Japanese Who Were There-
By Ara Ken’ichi
Chapter 2 Nanjing, as Observed by Japanese Soldiers
“As a matter of fact, I sympathize with China. I did not agree with the establishment of Manchuria. In the Nisshi-jihen or China Incident, Japan went too far. But as far as the refusing to surrender as advised in Nanjing, I think China was wrong. And eventually, the top commander, T'ang Sheng-chih (唐生智), himself escaped. …... This would be the same for a company. If the company’s leaders disappeared, the company would be left in chaos and their employees would steal goods and run away. Had they not refused surrender, the matter of prisoners would have never come up. If you look at international law, I think the path China had taken was the problem.” (From a statement by Mr. Okada Takashi, attached to General Matsui.)
Around the Safety Zone at Zhongshan Road, a stall for boiled gyoza started a business. The first customers were Japanese soldiers. (December 15th, 1937)
1. The Army 19) Interview with Major Yoshinaga Sunao (吉永朴), Staff Officer, 10th Army Mr. Yoshinaga Sunao served as Staff Officer in the 10th Army, then as Senior Staff Officer in the 3rd Army, then Chief of Staff in the 2nd Aviation Forces, and finally as Director of Imperial Japanese Army Air Academy, for which he is well-known today.
Mr. Yoshinaga was born in 1897, participating in the attack on Nanjing at the age of 40, and at the end of the War, he was 47 years old. When I interviewed him he was 88 years old but he looked stately and fine. He did not need a hearing aid. He told me, “You are the first person to ask me to talk about Nanjing,” and tried to remember the things from a long, long time ago.
It was December 27, 1985 when I interviewed him. Actually, I got a letter from him in the summer of that year, in which he responded my questions. His letter started by stating that the Nanjing massacre is a groundless rumor. And he answered my questions, one by one, on the controversial issues regarding Nanjing and ended the letter with: “If you want to know more details I can meet you.” Encouraged, I asked him for an interview at once and waited for his response. But he didn't respond after that. Considering his age, I assumed that his health might not be so good, so I waited patiently.
Around the same time, I got responses to my questions from Mr. Matsumae Misoo (松前未曽雄), the former executive secretary to the Minister of Army. Unexpectedly, however, soon I saw Mr. Matsumae’s obituary in the newspaper, less than one month after I got his letter. I did not get any sense that he was on the verge of death from his postcard, so I was really surprised. I thought that the same thing might have happened to Mr. Yoshinaga. I inquired about his health at the Army Officer’s Club, Kaikosha (偕行社). The reply was that Mr. Yoshinaga had no health problems.
But several months already passed since I sent my letter. I decided to call him, and his wife answered the phone. She said that Mr. Yoshinaga could not meet me. She explained that immediately after he got my letter, a stranger came to meet him on a similar issue and he defrauded Mr. Yoshinaga. Mr. Yoshinaga was terribly shocked by this and so he decided not to meet strangers anymore, he could not stand further shocks.
I understood his shock but I still had many things to ask him. I sent him a letter again, and called him again--finally, he agreed to meet me. The interview finally, conducted at the end of December. Under the circumstances, he was cautious, so the vice-manager of the retirement home where he lived, was present with us. Accordingly, one might imagine that there was a harsh atmosphere during the interview, but, in fact, Mr. Yoshinaga prepared a room for the interview and answered my questions politely, despite my questions focusing on the 10th Army, which may have sounded like an accusation.
– Mr. Uesuna Katsushichi (上砂勝七), Chief of Military Police, 10th Army, wrote in his memoir, Military Policeman for 31 Years¹, the following: After the Hangzhou Bay landing, the 10th Army had to rely on requisitions for food supply. The chief accountant of the 10th Army raged that he would go back Japan because he could not take responsibility for such an undesirable approach. Chief Staff Officer Tanabe tried to soothe him to settle the matter.
Have you heard of this argument within the 10th Army?
I knew Mr. Uesuna but never met him in face-to-face at Headquarters, I don't think this was true. I knew Captain Fujino Ranjo (藤野鸞丈), adjacent to the Chief of Military Police, too. While I was serving as the director of Imperial Japanese Army Air Academy, Mr. Fujino was the Chief of Tokyo Military Police. Mr. Fujino and I talked many times regarding the case of Ward Chief Colonel Uehara Shigetaro (上原重太郎), so we had many chances to talk several matters but I have never heard such things from Mr. Fujino.
– I assume that the requisition was really undertaken…
As soon as the 10th Army landed at Hangzhou Bay, they had to rush across the creek zone in order to reach the rear of the Shanghai Expeditionary Army as according to plan. So the Army soldiers, including the commander, raced along a field footpath with minimum equipment. The mountain artillery was disassembled and transported. Under the circumstances, the transportation corps landed everything in Shanghai, including our heavy equipment. The horses were exhausted, some of them just stood there like statues. Even my baggage was carried to Shanghai--it was a lot of trouble for me, too. In this situation, as Sun Tzu said in his book, The Art of War², “Rely on the enemy for food”, it was an inevitable part of the job.
– In his book Military Policeman for 31 Years, it says that the 10th Army had disciplinary problems, therefore the General Chief of Staff issued admonitions. How was the discipline of the 10th Army in general?
From Hangzhou Bay Landing until the Nanjing Attack, the 10th Army fought with speed and bravery. Some confuse their brave, reckless action with disciplinary problem. I regret that Mr. Uesuna brought up an entirely unacceptable discussion of the 10th Army.
– Did you move together with Headquarters before you reached to Nanjing?
Yes, I did.
– When did you enter Nanjing?
At the Nanjing Attack, the 10th Army’s Headquarters was deployed at Hong Lanbu (洪藍埠). Then the artillerymen joined us for the first time, and on December 12, the Oita Regiment hoisted the Japanese sun-flag on the rampart. I was ordered to establish the Headquarters of the Army by the Chief Staff, Major General Tanabe Moritake (田辺盛武), so on the early morning of the 13th, I entered Nanjing through China Gate (中華門). Walking one kilometer or so from the gate, I found Shanghai Saving Bank (上海儲備銀行) at the intersection of Zhu Qiaolu (朱雀路) and Health Road (健康路), and decided to use it as headquarters and made it ready for the Commander.
– What was the situation in Nanjing then?
I saw bodies abandoned near the rampart. They looked miserable, some of them were run over by cars. Looking them, I thought we had to win the war, and that the country which lost was just shattered. On the way to the Saving Bank, I met a family in descent shape. I gave them my name card and wrote on it “Let them pass freely through sentry lines.” This meant that the inside of the Nanjing was settled enough such that a family could walk about. I'd like to add: the number of Japanese soldiers who were allowed to enter Nanjing was limited. I was not in charge for issuing restrictions, so I do not know the details, but before the Nanjing attack, each Division was given an order concerning troop numbers.
– What did you do after December 14?
A couple of days later, I went to Xiaguan to confer on military operations. I saw a number of corpses of Chinese soldiers at the wharf--they were submerged in the Yangtze River.
– Were they all soldiers?
There were many Chinese in civilian-clothes. I heard later that in Nanjing a large number of military uniforms were discarded, so I guess that Chinese corpses in civilian-clothes were ben-i-hei, soldiers in civilian attire. I saw hanging corpses dressed in civilian clothes.
– Where?
I am not sure. To my memory, the corpses looked like they were hanged, but they might have been washed up shore due to the tide and so I thought that they had been hanged.
– Other than Xiaguan, did you visit any other place?
I climbed Mt. Zijin. I think it was December16, the day before the entrance ceremony. I was not impressed by Mt. Zijin in particular.
– Did you hear about a massacre by then?
No, not once.
– Muto Akira (武藤章), the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Central China Area Army, wrote in his memoir, From Philippines to Sugamo: “During the operations, General Matsui tried to respect Chinese standing to the extent that it was far from realistic. The General’s soft attitude frustrated some of the officers. A commander and divisional general, who considered strategy a priority, gave protest to the General. At Nanking, being lodged in a neighboring room, I could hear them quarreling furiously.” – I assume that this certain commander was Lieutenant General Yanagawa Heisuke (柳川平助). Did you come across such arguments?
I don't know what they were quarreling about, they might have been arguing about the Lady Bird (the accidental shelling of a British ship by the Japanese Army). The 10th Army had to move to attack Hangzhou immediately after the entrance ceremony, so they must have had no time for such an argument.
– When was the Hangzhou Attack decided?
I assume that the moment of Nanjing Attack, the Hangzhou Attack had already been decided. Lieutenant General Yanagawa insisted on capturing Hangzhou as well, so at his initiative, Lieutenant Colonel Terada Masao (寺田雅雄), who was in charge of strategy, planned the Hangzhou Attack. The operational plan was presented to Headquarters. Therefore, at the moment of entering Nanjing, Headquarters had already prepared to move on to Hangzhou. Lieutenant General Yanagawa’s idea was that Japan had to capture the triangular area of Shanghai – Nanjing – Hangzhou, then to wait for diplomatic negotiations. He submitted his idea again after he returned Tokyo.
– Did the Commander Yanagawa have the idea of attacking Nanjing from the beginning?
Yes, he did. At first, the 10th Army focused on the attack of Shanghai from the rear but Commander Yanagawa already had a plan to attack Nanjing. He presented his plan repeatedly. There were a lot of differences between his plan and Imperial Headquarters'.
– What kind of person was the Commander Yanagawa?
While I was in the 10th Army, I was constantly under Lieutenant General Yanagawa. He was great man and, even now, he has my deepest respect. He was a reticent person, in a word, he was a quiet hero. Lieutenant General Yanagawa loved China. On the way to Nanjing, he gathered several of his staff in the inner courtyard of a Chinese house, and watching the harvest moon, said that it was not a desirable thing for Japan and China to fight each other, however, duty is duty. After entered Hangzhou, the 10th Army was not engaged in battle--it was relatively peaceful. I even had time to play tennis. Shortly after, Lieutenant Colonel Terada Masao returned to Tokyo and I was ordered to become an instructor at the Military Staff College. But I had tasks to be completed, so I asked Major General Iimura Yuzuru (飯村穣), the director of the Military Staff College, to allow me to stay in China for a little longer and I did my tasks under Colonel Fujimoto Tetsukuma (藤本鉄熊). The Headquarters of the Army was at a place called Xileng Fantien (西冷飯店) near West Lake, and Lieutenant General Yanagawa lodged at a wealthy Chinese man's house located close to Headquarters. It was said the Commander Yanagawa recited a sutra everyday. I wrote a battle report for the 10th Army, and visited the Commander Yanagawa several times in order to get his signature. I stayed on with the last of the 10th Army soldiers and on February 26, 1938, when the Commander Yanagawa returned to Tokyo, in triumph, I accompanied him. After the War, I met the Commander's wife and his daughter. Still now, I keep in contact with his daughter.
– In the beginning of February Lieutenant General Honma Masaharu (本間雅晴), Chief of the Second Section of the General Staff Headquarters visited Hangzhou. Did you meet him?
Lieutenant General Honma was my instructor at the Military Staff College who taught me current circumstances regarding the UK. He knew my brother, who was a doctor, too. But I have no memory of meeting him in Hangzhou.
– It is said there was a massacre in Nanjing.
I have the firm belief that there was no massacre in Nanjing. Most of all, Chinese civilians escaped quickly. Only a few were left. Furthermore, if Japanese soldiers had killed hundreds and thousands of Chinese, how would they have accomplished this? Even if they had made every Chinese line-up, it still would not have been possible. The number “hundreds and thousands” is a huge amount that you cannot move through such a group of prisoners. There was not even that many people left in Nanjing (before the attack). Like the Chinese saying, hakuhatsu sanzen-jo, or 3,000 jou of white hair, the Chinese made mentions of “massacres” much later. My conclusion is: there was no massacre.
* 1-jo or 1 jou is approx. 3 meters.
¹ Uesuna Katsushichi, Military Policeman for 31 Years, Tokyo Life Inc., Tokyo, 1955.
² The Art of War, written by Sun Tzu (5th century B.C.), is a book composed of 13 chapters on ancient Chinese military strategy. This book is utilized even today by the US Army.
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The Nanjing Incident: Japanese Eyewitness Accounts-Testimony from 48 Japanese Who Were There-
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